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The “ all weather “ friendship that China and Pakistan continue to reaffirm time and again needs a careful study and consideration particularly by planners in New Delhi. For the unusual nature of this relationship has significant implications for India. Despite touting the relationship as all weather friendship, it vital to understand that both Beijing and Islamabad are not treaty allies. There is no mutual defence pact between the two that considers attack on one as attack on another.
This factor is particularly relevant in current scenario when Iran,another country close to Beijing,is withstanding American military and economic onslaught. While China may provide Iran with limited military assistance in form of arms,diplomatic and intelligence support its assistance is most likely to stop short of sending its People’s Liberation Army to intervene militarily against Israel and the US. However the same logic may not hold true in case of Pakistan.
This is not to de value Iran’s importance to Chinese strategic thinking. After all China is the largest importer of Iranian crude and Iran is crucial part of China’s middle eastern policy. Iranian strategic location right around the straits of Hormuz makes Tehran vital to China’s energy security. Yet Iran cannot offer the same benefits that Pakistan does to Beijing.
For starters unlike Pakistan,Iran does not share a land border with China making any military assistance logistically difficult for Beijing. Moreover Pakistan has historically been militarily and economically embedded and strategically aligned with China for decades. Pakistan is substantial importer of Chinese weapons and defence systems and two countries are even involved in joint production of JF 17 Thunder fighter aircraft. Pakistan provides China with a natural counter weight to India and has previously been a critical element in shaping its India policy. From Chinese point of view, enmity between India and Pakistan helps Beijing in boxing India within South Asia by keeping a check on New Delhi’s great power ambitions. Fear of two front war results in New Delhi having to divide her attention and forces on among its western,eastern and northern borders. This is of immense strategic value to China.
All this does not imply that in event of an India -Pakistan conflict,China will automatically enter the frame by invading India. The nature and shape the geography of the conflict takes will test Chinese calculations and dictate whether Beijing responds with military force.
Pakistani control over Gilgit Baltistan is vital to China as this region connects the two countries. Any Indian attempt, in event of conflict with Pakistan,to establish a permanent hold over this part of the region will send alarm bells ringing in Beijing forcing them to consider a military intervention. This of course after all diplomatic,economic and political means are exhausted to terminate the India-Pak war.
The Belt and Road initiative of which the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a flagship project passes through the territory of Gilgit Baltistan. That makes the Pakistani control of that region even more significant for China.
The implications for India are obvious. It must be prepared for a two front confrontation if it ever considers attempting to integrate the whole of Kashmir including Gilgit Baltistan through military means.
